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Abstract
& Voluntary control processes can be recruited to facilitate
recollection in situations where a retrieval cue fails to auto-
matically bring to mind a desired episodic memory. We in-
vestigated whether voluntary control processes can also stop
recollection of unwanted memories that would otherwise have
been automatically recollected. Participants were trained on
cue–associate word-pairs, then repeatedly presented with the
cue and asked to either recollect or avoid recollecting the
associate, while having the event-related potential (ERP) cor-
relate of conscious recollection measured. Halfway through
the phase, some cues switched instructions so that participants
had to start avoiding recall of associates they had previously
repeatedly recalled, and vice versa. ERPs during recollection
avoidance showed a significantly reduced positivity in the cor-
relate of conscious recollection, and switching instructions
reversed the ERP effect even for items that had been previously
repeatedly recalled, suggesting that voluntary control processes
can override highly practiced, automatic recollection. Avoiding
recollection of particularly prepotent memories was associated
with an additional, earlier ERP negativity that was separable
from the later voluntary modulation of conscious recollection.
The findings have implications for theories of memory retrieval
by highlighting the involvement of voluntary attentional pro-
cesses in controlling conscious recollection. &
INTRODUCTION
In memory research, a distinction has been made be-
tween incidental recollection, where a retrieval cue auto-
matically and unintentionally brings to mind an associated
episodic memory, and intentional recollection, where a
retrieval cue fails to automatically bring a wanted mem-
ory to mind, and people have to engage voluntary re-
trieval strategies to successfully recollect the memory
(e.g., Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995; Richardson-
Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1994). A corresponding vol-
untary control over recollection has been suggested to
operate in situations where, upon encountering a re-
trieval cue, people wish to stop the associated memory
from coming to mind. Stopping recollection of an un-
wanted memory is thought to require the involvement
of active, voluntary control processes—if recollection is
the prepotent, automatic response to a cue, and retrieval
therefore has to be actively overridden (Anderson et al.,
2004; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Green, 2001).
By measuring the brain activity correlates of conscious
recollection during memory tasks, a number of studies
have provided evidence that people can strategically
control recollection (Bergstro¨m, Velmans, de Fockert, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2007; Depue, Curran, & Banich,
2007; Fraser, Bridson, & Wilding, 2007; Dzulkifli, Herron,
& Wilding, 2006; Dzulkifli & Wilding, 2005; Herron &
Wilding, 2005; Wilding, Fraser, & Herron, 2005; Anderson
et al., 2004; Herron & Rugg, 2003a, 2003b; Dywan,
Segalowitz, & Arsenault, 2002; Dywan, Segalowitz, Webster,
Hendry, & Harding, 2001; Dywan, Segalowitz, & Webster,
1998). However, none of the above studies directly ad-
dressed to what extent recollection of potentially rec-
ollectable materials can be voluntarily avoided when
retrieval is the prepotent, automatic response. This issue
not only has implications for theories of cognitive con-
trol and memory retrieval but also has practical appli-
cations for brain activity tests of concealed information
(e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 1991), which rely on the as-
sumption that memory-related brain activity should be
uncontrollably elicited by retrieval cues related to the
concealed information. In the current study, we there-
fore aimed to determine whether it is possible to vol-
untarily avoid automatic recollection.
A clear distinction between intentional and inciden-
tal recollection dates back to Ebbinghaus (1885/1964; in
Mace, 2006). This distinction has been incorporated in
more recent interpretations of level-of-processing ef-
fects in implicit memory tests (Richardson-Klavehn &
Gardiner, 1995; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, et al.,
1994; Richardson-Klavehn, Lee, Joubran, & Bjork, 1994)
and in models of episodic memory retrieval. Moscovitch
(1992) suggested that incidental episodic retrieval relies
on automatic cue–trace interactions mediated by the
medial-temporal lobe (MTL)/hippocampus. In contrast,
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intentional episodic retrieval relies on voluntary control
processes mediated by frontal brain regions, that devise
and initiate retrieval strategies if the initial retrieval cue is
insufficient to elicit automatic recollection, and in doing
so, interacts with the MTL/hippocampus to elicit recol-
lection of the desired memory. A large amount of func-
tional neuroimaging literature now supports the idea
that frontal areas are involved in strategic aspects of re-
trieval (see Buckner, 2003, for a review) and that hippo-
campal activation is more closely related to the actual
recollection of an event than the intention to remember
an event (Rugg, Fletcher, Frith, Frackowiak, & Dolan,
1997; Schacter, Alpert, Savage, Rauch, & Albert, 1996).
Anderson and Green (2001) introduced the idea that
voluntary strategic processes may also be involved in
situations where the goal is to stop automatic recollec-
tion from taking place. In their think/no-think paradigm,
participants initially learn a list of cue–response pairs
and are then repeatedly presented with the cue, and
asked to either recall the associated memory response
(the think condition), or to completely prevent the as-
sociated response from entering consciousness (the no-
think condition). It is assumed that upon processing of
the cue, the prepotent response is to automatically
retrieve the associate, and to achieve successful avoid-
ance of recollection, automatic retrieval has to be pre-
vented by active control processes (Anderson et al.,
2004; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Green, 2001).
Indirect evidence that prepotent recollection has been
voluntarily stopped comes from a surprise final recall
test, in which recall of the previously avoided memories
is typically impaired compared to a baseline condition
which measures simple forgetting over time. It is rea-
soned that a significant impairment of no-think asso-
ciates must be a consequence of the involvement of
executive control processes in stopping prepotent rec-
ollection, as beyond-baseline forgetting of no-think as-
sociates should only be found if stopping recollection
had required additional, effortful processing. However,
the relationship between voluntary avoidance of recall
and subsequent beyond-baseline forgetting is not clear
cut because it has been suggested that only memories
that initially come to mind are subsequently impaired
(Depue et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2004). It is there-
fore unclear on the basis of the behavioral evidence
to what extent prepotent recollection can be success-
fully avoided at the time that attempted avoidance oc-
curs, and whether intrusive memories can be voluntarily
avoided without being subsequently forgotten.
Stronger evidence that recollection can be voluntarily
avoided was found in two fMRI studies using the think/
no-think task, which reported that hippocampal activity
was reduced during no-think trials compared to think
trials (Anderson et al., 2004), and that both hippocam-
pal and visual representational activity was reduced dur-
ing no-think trials compared to baseline levels of activity
(Depue et al., 2007), indicating reduced recollection of
no-think associates. In addition, both studies showed
increased activity for no-think trials in a number of fron-
tal regions that are typically involved in cognitive con-
trol, such as the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex, the fronto-polar cortex, and the ACC, indicating
that participants were engaging effortful control pro-
cesses to avoid recollection. However, neither of the
studies directly manipulated or measured the intrusive-
ness of the memories to-be-avoided, thus only provide
indirect evidence that prepotent recollection was volun-
tarily avoided.
In the ERP domain, researchers have used the ERP
correlate of conscious recollection to investigate wheth-
er recollection can be strategically controlled. The ERP
correlate of conscious recollection is a positive shift of
the ERP at centro-parietal regions, typically left-lateralized,
maximal approximately 500 to 800 msec after stimulus
presentation (Rugg, 1995; Smith, 1993; Paller & Kutas,
1992). The effect is specifically linked to recollection be-
cause it is larger if participants, in addition to recognizing
previously presented items as old, can also correctly iden-
tify their source (Wilding, 2000; Wilding & Rugg, 1996;
Wilding, Doyle, & Rugg, 1995), and if the items are asso-
ciated with a ‘‘remember’’ (contextual recollection) rather
than ‘‘know’’ (familiarity) judgment (Du¨zel, Yonelinas,
Mangun, Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; Smith, 1993). Moreover,
the effect is absent in neuropsychological patients with
impaired recollection due to hippocampal lesions (Du¨zel,
Vargha-Khadem, Heinze, & Mishkin, 2001). Importantly
for the current research, in associative cued recall tasks,
the effect is only found for recognized old recall cues
for which recall of the associate is successful (Rugg,
Schloerscheidt, Doyle, Cox, & Patching, 1996). Although
typically known as the parietal ‘‘old/new’’ effect, we
refer to it as the parietal episodic memory (EM) effect
(Friedman & Johnson, 2000) because of the strong evi-
dence linking the effect with conscious recollection.
Initial evidence of voluntary control of recollection
as indexed by the parietal EM effect has been found in
studies using the target/nontarget exclusion paradigm
(Fraser et al., 2007; Dzulkif li et al., 2006; Dzulkif li &
Wilding, 2005; Herron & Wilding, 2005; Wilding et al.,
2005; Herron & Rugg, 2003a, 2003b; Dywan et al., 1998,
2001, 2002). In this paradigm, participants are, during
an initial encoding task, presented with two sets of stim-
uli that differ on some dimension (e.g., by being pre-
sented in different temporal or perceptual contexts).
This is followed by a modified old/new recognition test,
in which only one set of old items is designated as tar-
gets requiring one response at test, whereas the other
set of old items is designated as nontargets, which to-
gether with new items require another response at
test. The typical pattern of ERP findings has been that
when the probability of correctly recollecting targets
is high, the parietal EM effect occurs for targets com-
pared to new words, but not for nontargets compared
to new words. If memory for the target information is
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poor (e.g., when there has been less elaborative encod-
ing in the study phase), the parietal EM effect occurs for
both targets and nontargets compared to new words.
The interpretation of these findings has been that,
when target memory is good, conscious recollection is
strategically controlled to occur only in response to tar-
gets and not to nontargets (Herron & Rugg, 2003b).
This strategy might be efficient when target recollection
is likely because participants could successfully perform
the task by attempting to selectively recollect episodic
information associated with the targets only, and mak-
ing an ‘‘old’’ response only to items for which recol-
lection of target source information was successful.
The diagnostic value of this strategy would, however,
decrease when the probability of recollecting the tar-
get episode is low, as success or failure of target source
recall would be less informative, thus requiring recollec-
tion of both target and nontarget episodes for successful
task performance. However, the target/nontarget para-
digm does not explicitly ask participants to control
recollection, and thus, only provides indirect evidence
regarding such strategic control. In addition, there is no
indication in the target/nontarget task that recollection
is the prepotent response during test, so it provides little
information regarding the current issue of the extent
to which voluntary avoidance of automatic recollection
is possible.
More direct ERP evidence of voluntary avoidance of
recollection was provided by a recent study using a
modified version of the think/no-think procedure, which
separated ERPs in the think/no-think phase as a func-
tion whether the paired associates were learned or not
learned during the previous study phase (Bergstro¨m
et al., 2007). Comparing ERPs when participants were in-
structed to recollect versus avoid recollection of learned
versus not learned information permitted an examina-
tion of how successful participants were at controlling
recollection, as indicated by differences in the parietal
EM effect. Instructing participants to recollect learned
memories elicited a larger parietal EM effect than did
instructing participants to avoid recollection of learned
memories, and moreover, there was no difference in
the parietal EM effect for learned items for which partic-
ipants were avoiding recollection and for items that par-
ticipants had failed to learn but were trying to recollect.
The results demonstrated that recollection avoidance
was successful to the point where there was little neural
evidence of recollection for learned no-think items, pro-
viding strong evidence that conscious recollection of
recollectable information was successfully avoided on
an item-specific basis. However, similarly to the think/
no-think fMRI studies, although recollection is typically
assumed to be the prepotent response during the think/
no-think phase, this was not directly verified in the above
study, thus whether or not the results reflected volun-
tary avoidance of automatic recollection was not conclu-
sively determined.
An alternative explanation for why recollection could
be successfully avoided in both the target/nontarget
and the think/no-think studies is that perhaps the de-
fault state during both tasks is to not recollect, that is,
that the cues fail to elicit automatic recollection. Accord-
ing to this account, the memories that participants are
asked to recall require the involvement of intentional
control processes to achieve successful retrieval, and
successfully avoiding recall requires no voluntary con-
trol. This explanation fits with the large body of pre-
vious research on voluntary retrieval strategies (see
e.g., Buckner, 2003; Rugg & Wilding, 2000). Identify-
ing the locus of strategic processes in the control of
recollection—whether they act to stop retrieval of un-
wanted memories or to achieve successful retrieval of
wanted memories—is not possible on the basis of the
parietal EM effect alone because this effect is associated
with the actual recollection of an event, irrespective of
whether recollection is intentional or incidental (Curran,
1999).
In the present study, we tested directly whether
automatic recollection can be voluntarily avoided, and
manipulated the strength and flexibility of voluntary
control over recollection by requiring participants to
switch within-items between think and no-think strate-
gies, while measuring the ERP correlate of conscious
recollection. We first trained participants on a list of
word-pairs, tested their learning in an initial learning
test, and then repeatedly presented the first member
of the pair with standard think/no-think instructions to
either think of, or avoid thinking of, the associate word,
depending on the color of the cue word (Bergstro¨m
et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2004). Critically, following
the first half of the cue presentations, participants were
told that half of the cues would swap color for the rest of
the phase, but that the other half of the cues would
remain in the same color as during the first half of the
presentations. They were told that the instructions as-
sociated with each color would remain the same so
that they would now be required to avoid recall of some
associate words that they had previously been repeat-
edly recalling, and to recall some associate words for
which they had previously avoided recall. It was rea-
soned that recalling some associates repeatedly (eight
times) in response to the cue during the first half of
presentations would ensure that recollection of those
associates was the prepotent, automatic response when
the cues swapped instructions (see Wheeler & Buckner,
2003 for a similar manipulation to achieve automatic
recollection). Testing whether the parietal EM effect
was significantly reduced in the second half of presen-
tations for items that had swapped from having been
repeatedly recalled to requiring avoidance of recol-
lection would thus allow the assessment of whether
prepotent recollection could be avoided. In addition,
participants rated their perceived difficulty and success
at avoiding recollection throughout the think/no-think
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phase, to verify that they were, indeed, employing ef-
fortful control to avoid recollection.
To ensure that differences in ERPs were due to vol-
untary processes at the time of recollection or recollec-
tion avoidance, as opposed to different proportions of
involuntary forgetting between the think and no-think
conditions, cues were only included in the main ERP
analysis if participants could recall the associate word
both in the initial learning test and in a surprise final
recall test following the think/no-think phase. This cri-
terion meant that we could be confident that for all
cues included in the ERP conditions, participants could
recollect the associate should they try to do so, and
therefore, our predicted ERP differences in the parietal
EM effect could be ascribed to voluntary processes at
the time of recollection avoidance. The current study
thus addressed the question of whether people are
able to voluntarily avoid conscious recollection of de-
monstrably recollectable information. This question is
logically independent of the further question of whether,
and if so how, successful voluntary avoidance of recol-
lection leads to later memory impairment, as investigated
in previous research (e.g., Depue et al., 2007; Depue,
Banich, & Curran, 2006; Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson
& Green, 2001). In fact, voluntary avoidance of recollec-
tion is better investigated in situations without subse-
quent enhanced forgetting of the avoided information,
because it means that the issue can be examined uncon-
founded by ERP differences between conditions in terms
of processes related to differential later forgetting.1
Thus, we emphasize that we make no claim in the cur-
rent article to demonstrate ERP differences related to
processes causative of later forgetting.
Successful voluntary avoidance of episodic recollection
predicts a reduction in the positivity of the parietal EM
effect for no-think items compared with think items. If
participants are successful at controlling recollection dur-
ing the first half of the think/no-think presentations, the
positivity of the left parietal EM effect should be reduced
for the two ERP conditions that have no-think as their
first half instruction compared to the two ERP conditions
that have think as their first half instruction. During the
second half of the presentations, if participants fail to
switch recall strategy for items that swap between the
think and no-think conditions, we should observe the
same pattern of amplitudes in the parietal EM effect on
the basis of first half instructions. If participants can suc-
cessfully switch recall strategy for items that swap think/
no-think conditions, the ERPs should separate on the
basis of second half instructions, with the positivity of
the parietal EM effect reduced for the two ERP conditions
that have no-think as their second half instruction com-
pared to the two ERP conditions that have think as their
second half instruction. Such a finding would indicate
that voluntary control over recollection is strong and flex-
ible. In particular, finding a significantly reduced positivity
of the parietal EM effect for items that had swapped from
think to no-think instructions would suggest that auto-
matic recollection of prepotent memories can be volun-
tarily avoided.
METHODS
Participants
Four participants were replaced due to excessive EEG
artifacts. The final sample consisted of 24 (7 men) right-
handed, native English speakers (mean age = 22 years,
range = 18–31 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, including normal color vision. The study was
approved by the Goldsmiths College Psychology Depart-
ment Ethics Committee. All participants gave informed
consent prior to their inclusion in the study, and received
either a small payment or course credits.
Materials
The stimuli consisted of 48 weakly related word-pairs, of
which 8 were fillers. The pairs were previously used in
Bergstro¨m et al. (2007) and Anderson et al. (2004). The
assignment of word-pairs to each of the four experimen-
tal conditions (10 pairs in each) was counterbalanced
across participants. In our adaptation of the task, we did
not include a behavioral baseline condition because the
aim of the experiment was to investigate voluntary con-
trol over recollection of recollectable material, for which
measuring subsequent forgetting compared to baseline
is not required.
Procedure
Stimulus presentation was done using E-Prime v1.1 soft-
ware (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). At
arrival, participants were fitted with an EEG recording
cap for gathering the ERP data and were seated in
an electrically shielded and sound- and light-attenuated
Faraday cage, facing a shielded display monitor. In
the initial learning phase (Phase 1), 48 word-pairs were
presented in a random order on a computer screen
(5000 msec duration, 1000 msec intertrial interval), and
participants were asked to memorize the word-pairs for
a later test. Immediately following study, participants
undertook a test of initial learning by being given one
of the words as a cue and were asked to recall the as-
sociate word. If less than 25% correct, the study presen-
tation phase was repeated and memory was tested again
in the same manner (no one required more than two
presentations to achieve minimum accuracy).
Next, participants received instructions for the think/
no-think phase, which were adapted from the Anderson
et al. (2004) protocol and identical to those used in
Bergstro¨m et al. (2007). They were told that they would
again be presented with the cue words from the previous
memory test, but that this time the task would differ de-
pending on the color in which the word was presented.
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The color representing each condition was counter-
balanced across participants. After a 2000-msec fixation
cross, the cue word was displayed for 2000 msec in
the center of the screen, in either yellow or light blue.
After 2000 msec, a green star appeared below the word
and this display lasted for another 1000 msec, until it
was replaced by a black screen, also with a duration of
1000 msec. Participants were asked to only blink while
the green star or the black screen was displayed. To en-
sure that ERPs were not differentially affected by activity
related to the preparation and execution of a verbal re-
sponse, verbal responding was required in all conditions
(delayed to prevent motor-related electrical artifacts af-
fecting the ERPs). On think trials, participants were in-
structed to immediately recollect the associated response
for each cue, and silently keep it in mind for 2000 msec
until the green star appeared, when they should say the
response aloud. If they were not able to remember the
response, they should say ‘‘think’’ when the green star
appeared. On no-think trials, participants were told that
they would still have to read the cue word and pay full
attention to it, but that they were to avoid thinking of its
associate response completely, never allowing it to enter
consciousness. When the green star appeared in the
no-think condition, participants were to always respond
‘‘no.’’ For initially learned items, participants’ accuracy at
verbalizing the think responses and responding ‘‘no’’ to
no-think cues was at ceiling, and the few trials in which
an incorrect response was given were excluded from the
ERP conditions.
After a practice think/no-think phase on eight filler
items, the experimental think/no-think phase was ad-
ministered, in which 20 cues appeared in each think or
no-think color, intermixed into a list of 40 cues displayed
in a random order. Lists were repeatedly presented,
divided into four blocks of four lists each with short
breaks between blocks (16 list presentations in total).
After each four-list block, participants were asked to rate
how difficult they had found it to avoiding thinking of
the no-think associates in that block on a scale between
1 (extremely easy) and 7 (extremely difficult), and to
estimate the percentage of trials on which they had been
able to completely prevent the no-think associates from
coming to mind.
After the first two blocks (i.e., 8 presentations, half
of the total number of presentations), participants were
given new instructions informing them that in the fol-
lowing two blocks, the color in which some of the words
would be presented would swap, so that some of the
words that were presented in yellow during Blocks 1
and 2 would be presented in blue during Blocks 3 and
4, and some words that were presented in blue during
Blocks 1 and 2 would be presented in yellow during
Blocks 3 and 4, whereas the rest of the words would
continue to be presented in the same color in which
they were presented previously. The instructions asso-
ciated with each color remained the same so for cues in
the think color, they should still think of the associated
word as fast as possible, and for cues in the no-think
color, they should still completely avoid thinking of the
associated word. It was emphasized that because some
words had swapped conditions this could take a bit of
extra effort so they should try their best. The task was
then continued for another two blocks with four lists
each so that each item was presented eight additional
times after the new instructions.
Following the think/no-think phase, a final recall test
was conducted, with all cue words presented in white
for 5 sec (each cue presented once in a random order)
and participants were asked to ignore previous instruc-
tions and give the associated response to each cue. The
purpose of the final recall test was to detect any items
that participants may have forgotten during the think/
no-think phase and exclude those from the ERP analysis,
to ensure that any ERP effects were due to voluntary
processing of recollectable information, and not due to
different proportions of forgotten items between the
conditions. Finally, participants were given a question-
naire (courtesy of Benjamin J. Levy and Michael C.
Anderson) which asked them a number of questions
regarding the strategies they had used to avoid recollec-
tion on no-think trials, and the degree to which they had
been following no-think instructions. The questionnaire
data were collected with the aim to correlate parietal
EM effects with self-reported strategies.
EEG Recording and Data Processing
EEG was recorded using Neuroscan (El Paso, TX) Synamps
DC-amplifiers from 30 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes at stan-
dard locations from the extended 10–20 system using
a Neuroscan Easycap, with two additional sets of linked
electrodes measuring the electrooculogram (VEOG and
HEOG), and referenced to the average of mastoids (band-
width 0.1–100 Hz, gain 500, sampling rate 250 Hz). Elec-
trode scalp impedances were kept below 10 k. Acquired
data were analyzed using Neuroscan Edit software, ex-
cept for the topographic plotting which was done using
EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The continuous
EEG data were filtered digitally (0.3–30 Hz, two-pass
Butterworth with zero phase shift) and re-referenced to
an average reference in line with Bergstro¨m et al. (2007).
Epochs were created off-line beginning 200 msec prior to
stimulus onset and lasting until 1500 msec poststimulus.
Epochs containing artifacts with a base to peak amplitude
exceeding 112 AV on any channel or 90 AV on HEOG
were excluded, and epochs were also inspected manu-
ally, with any further epochs that were deemed to con-
tain artifacts being rejected. The average rejection rate
was 12.6% (range 4–26%). ERPs were separately averaged
across the first half of cue-word repetitions and across
the second half of cue-word presentations for the four
conditions on the basis of first half think/no-think instruc-
tions and second half think/no-think instructions. Cues
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that received think instructions both in the first and
second half of presentations are referred to as T–T, cues
that received think instructions in the first half but no-
think instructions in the second half of presentations
are referred to as T–NT, cues that received no-think
instructions in the first half but think instructions in the
second half are referred to as NT–T, and cues that
received no-think instructions both in the first and sec-
ond half of presentations are referred to as NT–NT. After
artifact rejection, the mean number of trials contribut-
ing to the ERPs in the first half was T–T: 48; T–NT: 48;
NT–T: 47; and NT–NT: 46; and in the second half was
T–T: 50; T–NT: 50; NT–T: 49; and NT–NT: 48. All partic-
ipants who were included in the analysis had more than
15 artifact-free trials in each condition.
In order to verify that the predicted parietal ERP ef-
fects reflected voluntary modulations of item-specific
recollection rather than more general task-related dif-
ferences, a follow-up analysis was performed for a sub-
set of 10 participants by creating ERPs also for items that
were neither successfully learned on the initial learning
test nor successfully recalled on the final test (in line
with Bergstro¨m et al., 2007).2 The ERPs for these not-
learned items were compared against the ERPs for the
successfully learned items for the same participants. Be-
cause the only difference between conditions during
the first half of presentations was whether items were
presented with first half think or no-think instructions,
the ERPs for the first half were collapsed across sec-
ond half instruction to increase signal-to-noise ratio, into
average learned and not learned first half think and no-
think conditions (mean trial numbers for the first half:
average learned think: 75; average not learned think:
49; average learned no-think: 75; average not learned
no-think: 44). ERPs for the second half were, how-
ever, computed separately for learned and not learned
T–T, T–NT, NT–T, and NT–NT conditions to investi-
gate whether the predicted second half effects were
memory-specific (mean trial numbers per condition for
the second half: learned ERP conditions: T–T: 41, T–NT:
38, NT–T: 39, NT–NT: 40; not learned ERP conditions:
T–T: 22, T–NT: 31, NT–T: 26, NT–NT: 23). Again, all par-
ticipants who were included in the follow-up analysis
had more than 15 artifact-free trials in each condition.
On the basis of prior results (Bergstro¨m et al., 2007),
it was predicted that the differences in parietal EM posi-
tivity between think and no-think trials should be pres-
ent primarily for learned items and not for not-learned
items. Such a result would support the conclusion that
the parietal ERP modulations primarily reflected suc-
cessful recollection or successful avoidance of recollec-
tion of specific items rather than generic, task-related
processes, as the latter would be expected to be en-
gaged irrespectively of the learning status of the items
(see Bergstro¨m et al., 2007). Furthermore, including
not-learned items in the follow-up analysis provided
a baseline measure for assessing the extent of success
at recollection avoidance of learned no-think items be-
cause item-specific memory was absent for the not-
learned items. Not-learned items were expected to have
overall most negative parietal ERPs in the typical parietal
EM effect time window, reflecting a lack of recollection
of those items, but parietal ERPs for learned no-think
items should be reduced to similar levels if recollection
avoidance was successful.
ERP Statistical Analysis
The main ERP statistical analysis was conducted using
‘‘nonrotated’’ spatio-temporal task partial least squares
(PLS), a multivariate statistical technique that allows ex-
amination of distributed patterns of spatial and temporal
dependencies in the ERP data (Kovacevic & McIntosh,
2007; McIntosh, Chau, & Protzner, 2004; McIntosh &
Lobaugh, 2004; Du¨zel et al., 2003; Lobaugh, West, &
McIntosh, 2001; McIntosh, Bookstein, Haxby, & Grady,
1996). PLS computes the ‘‘cross-block’’ covariance be-
tween a matrix of dependent measures (the spatio-
temporal ERP distribution) and a set of exogenous
measures, in this case, orthogonal contrast vectors rep-
resenting the experimental conditions (the number of
contrasts equal to the degrees of freedom in the ex-
perimental design), thereby constraining the solution
to covariance attributable to the experimental manipu-
lation (McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004). The PLS analysis
outputs latent variables (LVs) that contain three types of
information: (1) a design salience (singular profile) that
represents a particular pattern of contrasts between ex-
perimental conditions; (2) electrode saliences (singular
image), which identify the electrodes that most strongly
covary at a particular point in time with the experimental
contrast expressed in the design salience; and (3) sin-
gular values, which are used to estimate the amount of
cross-block covariance accounted for by the LV. In non-
rotated PLS (Kovacevic & McIntosh, 2007; McIntosh &
Lobaugh, 2004), a priori defined contrasts are used as
the design saliences of the LVs, and it thus allows a di-
rect assessment of the hypothesized experimental ef-
fects. The sums of squares of the cross-block covariance
between each contrast matrix and the spatio-temporal
data matrix are used as singular values and are tested for
significance using permutation test, where each partic-
ipant’s data are randomly reassigned without replace-
ment to different experimental conditions and the sums
of squares recomputed. After a large number of such
randomizations, the number of times the sums of squares
of the permutation exceeded the sums of squares of the
observed data is computed, giving an exact significance
value for the observed LV. The standard errors of the
electrode saliences are estimated through bootstrap sam-
pling, using sampling with replacement and keeping the
experimental conditions fixed for all observations, and
the electrode saliences are then recalculated for each
bootstrap sample. The ratio of the electrode salience to
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the bootstrap standard error gives a standardized mea-
sure of reliability that is approximately equivalent to a
z score, whereby values above 1.96 and below 1.96 are
reliably different from zero with a 95% confidence inter-
val (CI) if the bootstrap distribution is normal (McIntosh
& Lobaugh, 2004).
PLS has some major advantages to traditional univar-
iate analysis of mean amplitudes: PLS requires no initial
assumptions regarding temporal or spatial properties
of the experimental effects, and thus, minimizes the
subjective aspects of choosing which time windows
and electrode locations to perform analysis on. Because
PLS is a multivariate technique, it is more powerful than
univariate techniques when analyzing correlated brain
data (see McIntosh et al., 2004). The statistical assess-
ment is applied at the level of the full spatio-temporal
pattern so the number of statistical tests is minimized.
Bootstrap testing involves reliability rather than signif-
icance testing so no corrections for multiple compari-
sons are necessary for the bootstrap stage because no
further statistical test is performed. The analysis was
conducted using the PLSgui software from the Rotman
Research Institute, which runs in Matlab and is available
for download at (www.rotman-baycrest.on.ca/pls).
In the current analysis, nonrotated PLS was computed
separately for the first and second half of the presenta-
tions, using three orthonormal contrasts for each half,
which represented the main effect of first half think/
no-think instruction, the main effect of second half
think/no-think instruction and their interaction term.
The PLS was computed for all scalp electrodes across
a time window from 0 to 1500 msec. A total of 1000
permutations were used to estimate the significance
of each contrast, and the reliability of the electrode sa-
liences was estimated using 200 bootstraps. Significant
main effects received no follow-up analysis, and instead,
the bootstrap ratios of the electrode saliences of the
significant main effect contrasts were used directly to
determine which time windows and locations that reli-
ably showed the effect (i.e., values above 1.96 or below
1.96 were considered reliable as they were different
from zero with a 95% CI). Significant interactions were
followed up by simple comparisons on mean ampli-
tudes at electrodes and within 100 msec time windows
that were identified by the bootstrap ratios of the elec-
trode saliences of the PLS contrast as reliably expressing
the interaction with a 95% CI. We focused our follow-up
analysis on effects expressed during the first 1000 msec
of the epoch because this includes the time during
which recollection-related effects typically take place.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
In the initial test of learning (cued recall test) at the end
of the study phase, 71% of associate words were recalled
on average (range = 45–93%, SEM = 3.1%). Correct
recall of associate words in response to their respective
cue words in the final cued recall test was calculated
on an individual-participant basis as a percentage of the
number of items recalled in the initial test. Mean accu-
racy was T–T = 99.1%, SEM = 0.6%; T–NT = 98.8%,
SEM = 0.9%; NT–T = 94.7%, SEM = 2.0%; and NT–NT =
95.8, SEM = 1.5%. For items recalled in the initial test,
there was no significant difference in final recall mean
accuracy between the four conditions [there was a non-
significant trend for final recall to be lower for the two
conditions with no-think instruction in the first half com-
pared to the two conditions with a think instruction in
the first half: one-way repeated measures ANOVA with
the four conditions as levels: F(2.1, 47.7) = 2.5, p = .09,
Greenhouse–Geisser corrected]. Because items were
only included in the ERP conditions that were recalled
both in the initial test and in the final cued recall test,
the absence of a significant difference in final recall ac-
curacy meant that approximately equal numbers of ERP
observations were available for the four conditions.
Mean participant ratings of difficulty of and success
in avoiding recollection of no-think associates after each
block of presentations are presented in Figure 1. Ratings
were collected after each behavioral block of four pre-
sentations of each cue word [as opposed to the ERP
data, which were averaged collapsed across the first two
behavioral blocks (i.e., the first half of presentations)
and separately averaged across the following two behav-
ioral blocks (i.e., the second half of presentations) to
ensure sufficient signal-to-noise ratio in the ERP aver-
ages]. As a result, the reversal in think/no-think instruc-
tions for half of the items occurred between behavioral
Blocks 2 and 3. One-way repeated measures ANOVAs with
the four blocks as levels revealed significant omnibus ef-
fects of block on both difficulty [F(2.2, 50.4) = 12.9, p <
.001, Greenhouse–Geisser corrected] and success ratings
[F(2.1, 49.3) = 14.3, p < .001, Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rected]. Paired-sample t tests (against Bonferroni-corrected
a of .0125 for four family-wise comparisons) revealed
that whereas rated difficulty was significantly higher for
Block 1 than for Block 2 [t(23) = 8.3, p < .001] and
significantly higher for Block 3 than for Block 4 [t(23) =
3.8, p < .001], there were no significant differences in
rated difficulty between Block 1 and Block 3 [t(23) =
1.1, p > .3] or between Block 2 and Block 4 (t < 1).
Ratings of success at avoiding recollection were signifi-
cantly lower for Block 1 than for Block 2 [t(23) = 5.9,
p < .001] and significantly lower for Block 3 than for
Block 4 [t(23) = 4.7, p < .001], but again there were no
significant differences in rated success between Blocks 1
and 3 [t(23) = 1.6, p > .1] or Blocks 2 and 4 [t(23) = 1.9,
p > .06]. When ratings were collapsed across Blocks 1
and 2 and across Blocks 3 and 4 to enable a contrast
between first half and second half ratings (in order to
compare to ERP effects that were also collapsed across
first and second halves of the think/no-think phase),
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rated difficulty in avoiding recollection only marginally
decreased from the first (M = 5.2, SEM = 0.3) to the
second half [M = 5.0, SEM = 0.4; paired t < 1; on a scale
between 1 (extremely easy) to 7 (extremely difficult)].
Participants rated that they were successful at avoiding
recollection on 5% more of the no-think trials in the
second half (M = 64.1%, SEM = 3.5%) than in the first
half (M = 58.6%, SEM = 3.8%), a difference that was a
nonsignificant trend [paired t(23) = 2.0, p < .07].
The results of the posttesting questionnaire (courtesy
of Benjamin J. Levy and Michael C. Anderson) revealed
that there was large individual variability in preferred
strategies for avoiding recollection (items are summa-
rized for brevity).3 The most frequently reported strate-
gies were to ‘‘try to make the response leave mind by
shifting attention to something else,’’ ‘‘first push the
memory out of mind, and to make sure it stayed out,
shift attention to something else,’’ or to ‘‘focus on the
individual letters of the word, or the word’s overall vi-
sual appearance, in order to prevent the response from
coming to mind.’’ Correlations between the behavioral
data and the ERP effects are presented in a later section.
ERP Results
ERPs reported here were recorded during the think/no-
think phase intervening between the study phase and
the final cued recall test.
First Half
Figure 2 shows, for the four ERP conditions in the first
half of the think/no-think phase, the grand-average
waveforms recorded from electrodes at left and right
fronto-polar sites; left, midline, and right frontal sites;
the midline centro-parietal site; and left, midline, and
right parietal sites.
The nonrotated PLS revealed that the only contrast
that was significantly expressed in the spatio-temporal
data during the first half was a main effect of first half
think versus no-think instructions ( p < .01). Neither
the main effect of second half instruction nor the in-
teraction between first and second half instructions
neared significance (both ps > .4). The contrast be-
tween first half think and no-think instructions ac-
counted for 49.88% of the cross-block covariance. The
bootstrap test of the electrode saliences of this contrast
indicated that first half think conditions had reliably
more positive amplitudes than first half no-think con-
ditions across right central electrodes between around
350 and 450 msec poststimulus, and across left temporo-
parietal regions between around 450 and 800 msec
poststimulus, with a simultaneous polarity reversal so
that first half think conditions had reliably more nega-
tive amplitudes than first half no-think conditions across
right frontal sites. This contrast and the bootstrap ratios
of its electrode saliences to their standard errors are
presented in Figure 3.
In summary, in the first half of the think/no-think
phase, ERPs showed only modulations caused by the
first half think versus no-think instructions. The most
reliable and temporally extended modulation replicates
the findings of Bergstro¨m et al. (2007) of a larger late
left parietal positivity for think compared to no-think
trials, but there was also a weaker earlier right central
positivity for think compared to no-think trials.
Second Half
Figure 4 shows, for the four ERP conditions in the sec-
ond half of the think/no-think phase, the grand-average
Figure 1. Participants’ average
self-reported ratings of difficulty
and success at avoiding
recollection during each block
of presentations. Left: Average
participant ratings of how
difficult it was to avoid
recollection of no-think
associates in each block, on a
scale between 1 (extremely
easy) to 7 (extremely difficult).
Right: Average participant
estimates of the percentage
of trials in each block on which
they succeeded to avoid
recollection of no-think
associates. The lighter shade in
the base of the bars represents
the mean percentage of
items that were not initially
learned. Error bars depict the
95% confidence interval for
the means.
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waveforms recorded from electrodes at left and right
fronto-polar sites; left, midline, and right frontal sites;
the midline centro-parietal site; and left, midline, and
right parietal sites.
The nonrotated PLS on the second half spatio-temporal
data revealed that the main effect of first half think versus
no-think instructions was no longer significant ( p = .07)
and accounted for only 28.28% of the cross-block covari-
ance.4 Instead, there was now a significant main effect
of second half think versus no-think instructions ( p <
.01, accounting for 36.11% of cross-block covariance) and
the bootstrap ratio of the electrode saliences indicated
that the second half think conditions had reliably more
positive amplitudes than second half no-think conditions
across central and left parietal regions between around
450 and 650 msec poststimulus. This effect became more
left-lateralized across left temporo-parietal regions during
650 to 800 msec poststimulus. Similar to the think/no-
think effect in the first half, there was a polarity reversal
so that second half think conditions had reliably more
negative amplitudes than second half no-think condi-
tions across right frontal sites, although this time emerg-
ing later than the parietal effect from around 600 to
800 msec poststimulus. This contrast and the bootstrap
ratios of its electrode saliences to their standard errors
are presented in Figure 5A and 5B. The magnitudes of the
bootstrap ratios indicated that the main effect of second
half think/no-think instructions during the second half of
the presentations was more reliable across left parietal
sites than the main effect of first half think/no-think in-
structions had been during the first half of the presenta-
tions (see Figure 5B vs. Figure 3B).
In addition, the PLS contrast representing the inter-
action between first and second half think/no-think
instructions was also significant in the second half ( p <
.01, accounting for 35.71% of cross-block covariance).
Figure 2. Grand-average ERPs
for the four experimental
conditions during the first half
of presentations at left (Fp1)
and right (Fp2) fronto-polar
sites; left (F3), midline (Fz),
and right (F4) frontal sites;
the midline centro-parietal site
(CPz); and left (P3), midline
(Pz), and right (P4) parietal
sites. The head-plot in the
right bottom corner depicts
the electrode locations (the
coordinates of the electrode
sites have been shifted toward
the vertex in order to fit within
the head radius).
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The bootstrap test of the electrode saliences indicated
that this interaction effect was reliable across centro-
parietal sites as early as from approx. 250 to 550 msec
poststimulus, with a later emerging interaction in the
reverse direction across bilateral frontal sites, maximal be-
tween around 450 and 650 msec poststimulus. This con-
trast and the bootstrap ratios of its electrode saliences to
their standard errors are presented in Figure 5C and D.
To clarify the nature of the interaction effect, simple
comparison paired t tests were performed at two sites
that maximally showed the interaction as identified by
the PLS, the right fronto-polar site (Fp2), and the mid-
line centro-parietal site (CPz), in four time windows
that best captured the effect, 252 to 348 msec, and 352
to 448 msec, 452 to 548 msec and 552 to 648 msec, as
presented in Table 1. Across centro-parietal regions, the
ERPs for items which had changed to having a no-think
instruction from having a think instruction (i.e., the
T–NT condition) had more negative amplitudes from
252 to 648 msec compared to the items that continued
to be presented with a think instruction (i.e., the T–T
condition), and also had more negative amplitudes
than the items which had been presented with no-think
instructions in both halves (i.e., the NT–NT condition)
between 252 and 548 msec. In the earlier two time win-
dows (252 to 348 msec and 352 to 448 msec), the other
conditions were not significantly different from each
other, all having more positive amplitudes than the
T–NT condition.
In the later time windows (452 to 548 msec and 552 to
648 msec) at the centro-parietal site, however, the items
that had changed to a think instruction from a no-think
instruction (i.e., the NT–T condition) had more posi-
tive amplitudes than the items that continued to be
presented with a no-think instruction (i.e., the NT–NT
condition), consistent with the PLS results of a signifi-
cant main effect of second half instruction across parie-
tal sites in these later time windows.
At the right fronto-polar site, the pattern of effects
was rather different. In the earliest time window (252 to
348 msec), the only significant difference was a more
negative ERP for the items that had been presented with
think instructions in both halves (the T–T condition)
compared to items that had changed to a think from a
no-think instruction (the NT–T condition). In the 352 to
448 msec time window, items that had been presented
with think instructions in both halves still had the most
negative-going ERPs, but now only significantly more
negative than ERPs for items that had changed to a no-
think from a think instruction (the T–NT condition),
and this effect remained significant also in the 452 to
548 msec and 552 to 648 msec time windows. In ad-
dition, in the 452 to 548 msec window, the T–T condi-
tion again had significantly more negative amplitudes
than the NT–T condition, and now the items that had
been presented with no-think instructions in both halves
(the NT–NT condition) had more negative amplitudes
than items that had changed to no-think from think in-
structions (the NT–T condition).
The early negativity seen specifically for T–NT items
across centro-parietal sites carried over into the later
452–548 time window, causing these items to have par-
ticularly negative ERPs also in this time window. Because
we were particularly interested in whether the ERP cor-
relate of recollection—which typically emerges around
400–500 msec poststimulus—could be voluntarily re-
duced for items that swapped from a think to no-think
instruction, we were concerned that the early negativity
might be masking a later recollection-related increase
in positivity for T–NT items. To disentangle this early
Figure 3. The significant latent variable (LV) in the nonrotated
task-PLS analysis of ERPs during the first half of think/no-think
presentations. This LV expresses a main effect of first half think
versus no-think instructions (cross-block covariance accounted for
by this LV = 49.88%, p < .01). (A) The design contrast of the LV.
(B) Topographic maps of the bootstrap ratio of the electrode
saliences of the LV to their standard error. These resemble z-scores,
values > 1.96 or <1.96 are reliable with a 95% CI. Positive values
indicate that electrode amplitudes are showing the pattern expressed
in the design contrast in terms of more positive amplitudes for
conditions that have a positive design score than conditions that
have a negative design score, whereas negative bootstrap ratios
indicate that electrode amplitudes are showing the reverse pattern.
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negativity from the later think/no-think main effect, we
calculated a measure of parietal positivity increase from
the average of the earlier (252–448 msec) time windows
to the 452–548 msec time window, in order to compen-
sate for potential carryover of the earlier increased neg-
ativity. This measure was computed for each condition
at left (CP3), midline (CPz), and right (CP4) centro-
parietal sites, and left (P3), midline (Pz), and right (P4)
parietal separately, and these difference scores were
tested for significant differences between conditions.
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors
First half think/no-think instruction  Second half think/
no-think instruction revealed only significant main ef-
fects of second half instructions at all sites [CP3: F = 5.6,
p < .05; CPz: F = 7.8, p < .05; CP4: F = 9.9, p < .01; P3:
F = 8.1, p < .01; Pz: F = 7.3, p < .05; P4: F = 5.6, p < .05;
all dfs(1, 23)], but no significant main effects of first half
instruction and no significant interactions between first
and second half instructions (all ps > .17). The signifi-
cant main effects of second half instruction were, in all
cases, caused by significantly larger positivity increases
from the earlier to the late time window for the two
conditions with second half think instructions than the
corresponding increase for the conditions with second
half no-think instructions. Thus, the two no-think con-
ditions did not significantly differ from each other in the
amount of recollection-related positivity increase across
parietal and centro-parietal sites from the average of
252–448 msec to the 452–548 msec time window, but
their positivity increase was significantly smaller than
the corresponding increase for the two think conditions,
which did not differ from each other.
In sum, in the earlier part of the epoch from around
250 msec onward, there was a reduction in centro-
parietal positivity for the items that had changed from
think to no-think instructions, compared to the other
Figure 4. Grand-average ERPs
for the four experimental
conditions during the second
half of presentations at
left (Fp1) and right (Fp2)
fronto-polar sites; left (F3),
midline (Fz), and right (F4)
frontal sites; the midline
centro-parietal site (CPz);
and left (P3), midline (Pz),
and right (P4) parietal sites.
The head-plot in the right
bottom corner depicts the
electrode locations (the
coordinates of the electrode
sites have been shifted
toward the vertex in order
to fit within the head radius).
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Figure 5. The significant
latent variables (LV) in the
nonrotated task-PLS analysis of
ERPs during the second half of
think/no-think presentations.
The first LV (A and B) expresses
a main effect of second
half think versus no-think
instructions (cross-block
covariance accounted for by this
LV = 36.11%, p < .01). (A) The
design contrast of the LV. (B)
Topographic maps of the
bootstrap ratio of the electrode
saliences of the LV to their
standard error. These resemble
z-scores, values > 1.96 or
< 1.96 are reliable with a
95% CI. Positive values indicate
that electrode amplitudes are
showing the pattern expressed
in the design contrast in terms
of more positive amplitudes for
conditions that have a positive
design score than conditions
that have a negative design
score, whereas negative
bootstrap ratios indicate that
electrode amplitudes are
showing the reverse pattern.
The second LV (C and D)
expresses an interaction
between first half and second
half think versus no-think
instructions (cross-block
covariance accounted for by
this LV = 35.71%, p < .01).
(C) The design contrast of the
LV. (D) Topographic maps of
the bootstrap ratio of the
electrode saliences of the LV
to their standard error.
Table 1. Paired t Tests of ERP Mean Amplitudes at the Midline Centro-parietal Site (CPz) and the Right Fronto-polar Site
(Fp2) during the Second Half of Presentations in Four Time Windows that Best Captured the Interaction Effect between
First and Second Half Think/No-Think Instructions
252–348 msec 352–448 msec 452–548 msec 542–648 msec
Location Pair df t p t p t p t p
Centro-parietal midline (CPz) T–T vs. T–NT 23 3.3 .01 2.6 .01 4.6 .001 2.6 .02
T–T vs. NT–T 23 – – – – – – – –
NT–NT vs. NT–T 23 – – – – 2.1 .05 2.8 .01
NT–NT vs. T–NT 23 3.2 .01 2.3 .03 3.0 .01 – –
Right fronto-polar (Fp2) T–T vs. T–NT 23 – – 2.6 .02 4.8 .001 5.5 .001
T–T vs. NT–T 23 2.6 .02 – – 3.6 .001 – –
NT–NT vs. NT–T 23 – – – – – – – –
NT–NT vs. T–NT 23 – – – – 2.4 .03 – –
Conditions are items that had a think instruction during the first half and second half of presentations (T–T), items that had a think instruction
during the first half of presentations but changed to a no-think instruction during the second half (T–NT), items that had a no-think instruction
during the first half and second half of presentations (NT–NT), and items that had a no-think instruction during the first half of presentations but
changed to a think instruction during the second half (NT–T).
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three conditions. Although this interaction carried over
into the 452–548 msec time window, it was separable
from a main effect of second half think/no-think instruc-
tion, which was manifest as a centro-parietal positivity
increase for the two think conditions compared to the
two no-think conditions between 452 and 648 msec. In
the earlier time window, the strongest effect across
frontal sites, however, appeared to be more negative
amplitudes for items that had been presented with think
instructions in both halves compared to the other con-
ditions, in particular, compared to the items that had
changed from a think instruction in the first half to a
no-think instruction in the second half, which had the
most positive amplitudes.
The results show that reversing think/no-think in-
structions for some items between the first and second
half of presentations resulted in a reversal of the am-
plitude of parietal positivity maximal between 450 and
650 msec, whereas items that were presented with the
same think/no-think instructions in the first and second
half did not show a reversal of the amplitude of parietal
positivity. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 6, which
displays the grand-average waveforms for all ERP condi-
tions (A and C) in the first and second half of the think/
no-think phase at the midline parietal site (where the
reversal was most visible), and topographic maps of the
difference in mean amplitudes between 452 and 548 msec
between the two conditions that reversed instructions
(B) and the two conditions that did not reverse instruc-
tions (D).
The Memory-specific Nature of the Parietal EM
Effect Modulation
The follow-up analysis included ERPs from a subset of
10 participants, and compared their ERPs for the de-
monstrably learned conditions from the main analysis
against their ERPs for not-learned items (see section on
EEG Recording and Data Processing for method and
rationale). First and second half ERPs for these learned
and not-learned conditions at the left parietal site P3 (the
location typically used for testing recollection-related
ERP effects), and mean amplitudes between 452 and
548 msec at the same site (the time window when the
parietal EM effect was most reliable), are presented in
Figure 7. As can be seen in this figure, the subset of 10
participants showed the same pattern of parietal ERP
results for learned items in both the first and second
halves as the full sample did in the main analysis, but
there were very little effects of think/no-think instruc-
tions on parietal ERP amplitudes for not-learned items.
During the first half, learned items with a think
instruction showed particularly enhanced left parietal
positivities compared to learned no-think and both not-
learned conditions. Although there was a slightly en-
hanced positivity also for not-learned think compared to
not-learned no-think items, this effect was smaller than
Figure 6. Grand-average ERPs and topographic maps comparing
the two conditions that reversed instructions (A and B) and the two
conditions that did not reverse instructions (C and D) during the
first and second half of presentations at the midline parietal site (Pz).
(A) First and second half grand-average ERPs for the conditions that
reversed instructions (T–NT and NT–T). The black line above the ERP
graph indicates the time window displayed in the topographic maps
below (B). (B) Topographic maps of the average amplitude difference
between the T–NT and NT–T conditions (NT–T subtracted from T–NT)
between 452 and 548 msec (map scale 0.8 to 0.8 AV). (C) First and
second half grand-average ERPs for the two conditions that did not
reverse instructions (T–T and NT–NT). The black line above the ERP
graph indicates the time window displayed in the topographic maps
below (D). (D) Topographic maps of the average amplitude difference
between the T–T and NT–NT conditions (NT–NT subtracted from T–T)
between 452 and 548 msec (map scale 0.8 to 0.8 AV). Whereas the
amplitude difference between T–NT and NT–T clearly reverses polarity
between the first and second half (A and B), there is no corresponding
reversal in amplitudes between T–T and NT–NT (C and D).
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the corresponding effect for learned items (highly simi-
lar to Bergstro¨m et al.’s [2007] results). This pattern was
confirmed by a two-way repeated measures ANOVA
with the factors Think/No-Think instruction  Learn-
ing on the first half mean amplitude data (as above),
which in addition to a significant main effect of learning
[F(1, 9) = 6.2, p < .05] and a trend-level main effect
of think/no-think instruction [F(1, 9) = 3.9, p < .09],
also revealed a significant interaction between learning
and think/no-think instruction [F(1, 9) = 7.2, p < .05].
Paired t tests confirmed that the learned think condi-
tion was more positive than the not learned think
[t(9) = 3.6, p < .01] and the learned no-think conditions
[t(9) = 2.8, p < .05], but there were no significant dif-
ferences between the learned no-think condition and
the not-learned no-think condition [t(9) = 1.5, p > .15]
or between the two not-learned conditions [t(9) = 1.1,
p > .3].
During the second half, the two learned conditions
with second half think instructions had particularly posi-
tive parietal ERPs, whereas the two learned conditions
with second half no-think instructions had less positive
ERPs, and in particular, items that had swapped from
a prior think to a no-think instruction—mirroring the
pattern found in the main analysis. Not-learned items
had overall most negative ERPs (although approximately
equivalent to the learned T–NT items), and there were
virtually no differences between not-learned items in
mean parietal amplitudes in this time window. This pat-
tern was confirmed by a three-way repeated measures
ANOVA with the factors First half think/no-think instruc-
tion  Second half think/no-think instruction  Learn-
ing on the second half mean amplitude data5, which
confirmed that, in addition to significant main effects
of learning [F(1, 9) = 16.1, p < .01] and second half
think/no-think instruction [F(1, 9) = 2.5, p < .05], the
Figure 7. Grand-average ERPs and mean amplitudes at the left parietal site (P3) from the follow-up learning analysis. (A) Grand-average ERPs
for the average learned and not learned first half think and no-think conditions (collapsed across second half think/no-think condition) during
the first half of the think/no-think phase. The black line above the ERP graph indicates the time window of the mean amplitudes displayed in the
bar chart below (D). (B and C) Grand-average ERPs during the second half of the think/no-think phase for: (B) the four learned ERP conditions;
and (C) the four not-learned ERP conditions, separated dependent on first half and second half think/no-think condition. The black lines above
the ERP graphs indicate the time window of the mean amplitudes displayed in the bar chart below (E). (D and E) Mean amplitudes between
452 and 548 msec for: (D) the average learned and not learned first half think and no-think conditions during the first half of the think/no-think
phase; and (E) the learned and not learned T–T, T–NT, NT–T, and NT–NT conditions during the second half of the think/no-think phase. Error
bars depict the 95% confidence interval for the means.
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interaction between learning and second half think/
no-think instruction was highly significant [F(1, 9) =
14.6, p < .01]. There was also a trend-level interaction
between first and second half think/no-think instruc-
tions [F(1, 9) = 4.0, p < .08], but no other significant
effects. Testing the effect of second half think/no-think
instruction (collapsed across the levels of first half think/
no-think instruction) separately for learned and not-
learned items confirmed that the items with a second
half think instruction had significantly more positive
parietal ERPs than items with a second half no-think in-
struction only when they were successfully learned [t(9) =
3.5, p < .01], but not when they were not learned (t < 1).
Testing the effect of learning separately for items with
a second half think instruction and items with a second
half no-think instruction (again collapsed across first half
think/no-think instruction) confirmed that the learned
items had significantly more positive parietal ERPs than
not-learned items only when presented with a second half
think instruction [t(9) = 5.3, p < .001], but not when
presented with a second half no-think instruction [t(9) =
1.3, p > .2].
In sum, the results of the follow-up analysis that com-
pared the ERPs for think and no-think items that were
either successfully learned or not successfully learned
confirm that the parietal ERP modulations between 452
and 548 msec were dependent on item-specific memory,
and that the parietal ERPs for learned no-think items in
this time window were similar to the ERPs for not-learned
items. The fact that a subset of only 10 participants
showed the same pattern of ERP effects for learned
items as that found in the main analysis illustrates the
high reliability of these parietal EM effect modulations.
Correlations between Behavioral Data and the
ERP Effects
To correlate the behavioral data and the parietal EM ef-
fect, first, an overall think/no-think left parietal effect on
site P3 was computed by averaging together mean am-
plitudes between 452 and 548 msec for ERP conditions
with a think instruction in the first half and ERP condi-
tions with a think instruction in the second half, and sub-
tracting the average of ERP conditions with a no-think
instruction in the first and second half. This effect was
correlated with participants’ overall self-reported difficulty
in avoiding recollection (averaged across all blocks), over-
all self reported success at avoiding recollection (averaged
across all blocks) and the questionnaire data (number of
items = 23). The ERP effect did not correlate with either
self-reported difficulty or success (both ps > .5), and
only correlated significantly with one questionnaire item:
‘‘I didn’t actively try to make the response leave my mind.
However, I did actively resist acknowledging or attending
to the memory while it was in my mind. So, I didn’t push
it out or even try to divert my thoughts at all, but I did
actively disregard the response’s presence’’ (nonparamet-
ric rs = .6, significant against Bonferroni-corrected a =
.002 for 25 pairwise correlations).
To establish whether the early negativity seen for
T–NT items across centro-parietal sites during the sec-
ond half was related to the self-report data, we also
computed difference scores for T–NT subtracted from
the average of the other three conditions (because these
showed no early differences across centro-parietal sites)
at midline centro-parietal (CPz) and parietal (Pz) sites
(where the effect was maximal) during the two early
time windows (252–348 msec and 352–448 msec), and
correlated these scores with overall self-reported difficulty
and success at avoiding recollection and the question-
naire data (same as above). There were no significant
correlations between these difference scores and the be-
havioral data at the corrected a-level.
DISCUSSION
The current experiment investigated whether automatic
recollection can be voluntarily avoided, as indexed by
the ERP correlate of conscious recollection—the parie-
tal EM effect (e.g., Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman &
Johnson, 2000; Rugg et al., 1996; Smith, 1993; Paller &
Kutas, 1992). We found significant modulations of the
parietal EM effect as a function of whether participants
were asked to recollect or to avoid recollecting the
memory, indicating that participants could successful-
ly control recollection. Importantly, switching instruc-
tions for some items so that participants had to avoid
recall of words they had previously repeatedly recalled,
and vice versa, reversed the parietal EM effect for those
items, suggesting that avoiding recollection is possible
even when recall is highly overpracticed. The follow-
up analysis confirmed that these parietal modulations
were, in line with prior results (Bergstro¨m et al., 2007),
specifically dependent on whether participant had
successfully learned the associated response, thereby
strongly supporting the view that the effects reflected
recollection or recollection avoidance of specific items,
rather than memory-unspecific, task-related processes.
Furthermore, avoiding recollection of learned items re-
duced the parietal EM effect to similar levels as parietal
ERPs for items that had not been successfully learned in
the first place. This latter result suggests that attempts
at avoiding recollection of learned items were overall
highly successful, as little recollection would be ex-
pected to take place for not-learned items (Bergstro¨m
et al., 2007; Rugg et al., 1996). The results thus support
the notion that voluntary control processes can success-
fully override automatic recollection (Anderson et al.,
2004; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Green, 2001).
Self-reports
Participants’ self-reports indicated that they found avoid-
ing recollection difficult throughout the experiment,
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particularly in the beginning of the think/no-think phase,
and also after some items had swapped from a think to a
no-think instruction. They reported succeeding in avoid-
ing recollection, on average, around 50% of the trials in
the beginning of the think/no-think phase, a figure that
increased with practice but decreased when some items
swapped from a think to a no-think instruction. Average
self-reported success in avoiding recollection was at
the highest (at the end of the think/no-think phase) at
around 70% of the trials so that despite practice, partic-
ipants estimated that the unwanted memory still came
to mind on around 30% of the trials. The self-reported
ratings thus indicate that recollection was the prepotent,
automatic response to the retrieval cues throughout
the think/no-think phase in the current experiment, as
participants found it both highly difficult and reported
limited success in avoiding recollection. Such a pattern
would not be expected if recollection was not the auto-
matic response that had to be actively and effortfully
overridden. Having some items swap from a think to no-
think instruction appeared to increase the automaticity
of recollection for those items because it made recol-
lection avoidance more difficult and avoidance success
lower, but recollection seemed to have been the prepo-
tent response also before the swap, as has been pre-
viously suggested in the think/no-think task (Anderson
et al., 2004; Levy & Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Green,
2001).
First Half ERPs
In the first half of the think/no-think phase, we found
the predicted reduction in positivity of the parietal EM
effect for items with a first half no-think instruction, rep-
licating Bergstro¨m et al. (2007) and suggesting that
participants were able to limit recollection of no-think
associates during the first half of the phase. This pre-
dicted parietal modulation was preceded by a simi-
lar increased positivity for think compared to no-think
conditions between around 350 and 450 msec post-
stimulus, but with a scalp distribution maximal across
right central electrodes. However, because the first half
analysis involved a simple contrast between think and
no-think instructions, the functional significance of this
unexpected earlier effect is rather unclear. A number
of processes are likely to be differentially engaged be-
tween the think and no-think conditions, and an in-
crease in positivity across central electrodes around this
time window could reflect many of these processes. For
example, the effect could reflect some generic task
process related to the P300, such as target categorization
or increased attentional orienting to think cues (see
Polich, 2007 for a recent P300 review). Alternatively, the
ERP difference could reflect a strategic, retrieval-related
process such as a retrieval attempt elicited by think
cues, or a retrieval override attempt elicited by no-think
cues. These explanations are not possible to distin-
guish on the basis on the current data, hence, we
instead focus our discussion on the predicted parietal
modulation, and most importantly: what happened to
the parietal EM effect in the second half of the think/
no-think phase when the instructions for some items
reversed?
Second Half ERPs
In the second half, the effect of the think/no-think
instruction that items had been presented with in the
first half was no longer significant. Instead, there was a
significant effect of the current, second half think/no-
think instruction, with a significantly reduced positivity
of the parietal EM effect for items with a second half no-
think instruction compared to items with a second half
think instruction maximal between 450 and 650 msec,
indicating that participants were able to successfully
switch recollection or recollection avoidance strategy
for items that swapped between the think and no-think
conditions, while continuing with an unchanged strategy
for items that remained in the same think/no-think
condition as in the first half of presentations. The effect
of second half think/no-think instructions during the
second half of presentations was larger and more reli-
able than the effect of first half think/no-think instruc-
tions during the first half, indicating that—consistent
with the self-reports—participants were more successful
at performing the task during the second half of pre-
sentations, despite the fact that some items had re-
versed instructions. This finding suggests that practice
at avoiding recollection was more crucial to the ability
to successfully control retrieval of recollectable material
than the number of times a particular item had been
recollected or avoided.
Furthermore, in the second half of presentations,
there was also a significant interaction between first
and second half instruction variables, so that the ERPs
differed depending on whether items had swapped
instructions or not. This effect emerged earlier than
typical recollection-related effects, which typically onset
at 400–500 msec poststimulus (Rugg & Curran, 2007).
In contrast, the interaction effect in the current study
was manifest across centro-parietal regions as early as
from around 250 msec poststimulus, and consisted of
a reduced ERP positivity specifically for items that had
swapped from a think to a no-think instruction com-
pared to the other three conditions. Using the amount
of positivity increase from the early to later time window
as a conservative measure of recollection in the second
half, the two conditions with second half think instruc-
tions appeared to be associated with approximately
equal amounts of recollection, which was significantly
more than in the two conditions with second half no-
think instructions. Importantly, there was no differ-
ence between the two second half no-think conditions
in their amount of parietal positivity increase, which
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suggests that participants were approximately equally suc-
cessful in avoiding recollection irrespectively of wheth-
er the items had swapped from a think to no-think
instruction or had been presented with no-think in-
structions in both halves. Hence, there was no evidence
that the early negativity for items that swapped from
think to no-think instructions was simply masking a later
recollection-related increase in positivity for those items.
Because the early ERP negativity and the later parietal
modulation were dissociable both on a functional and
temporal basis, they are likely to reflect separable cog-
nitive processes.
The early ERP negativity appears to index a process
that is specifically involved when people attempt to
avoid recollection of particularly prepotent memories.
One possibility is that the effect reflects a voluntarily
initiated control process, which occurred at an earlier
stage than recollection, such as an executive control
process that enabled the override of particularly prepo-
tent recollection. Previous fMRI studies have identified
a frontal network that show increased activation during
no-think trials, which is thought to reflect voluntary con-
trol processes aimed at stopping recollection (Depue
et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Green,
2001). The early negativity found during particularly pre-
potent recollection avoidance may reflect some aspect
of this executive control network. Admittedly, this hy-
pothesis is rather speculative and would require further
research for validation.
Alternatively, the early negativity may not index a vol-
untary control process, but may instead be a relatively
automatic response to the increased interference or
conflict associated with items that swapped from over-
rehearsed, prepotent recollection to requiring voluntary
avoidance of recollection.6 Interference/conflict-related
ERP effects are often manifested as increased negativity,
both in long-term memory tasks (proactive interference;
Ro¨ssner, Rockstroh, Cohen, Wagner, & Elbert, 2000) and
in other interference tasks such as the Stroop task (e.g.,
West, 2003). It has been suggested that some of these
Stroop ERP negativities (that are typically found around
350–500 msec poststimulus) reflect conflict detection,
and are generated by a source in the ACC (Hanslmayr
et al., 2008; West, 2003). Applying the interference frame-
work to our current findings, the early increased neg-
ativity for cues that swapped from a think to no-think
instruction may reflect a relatively automatic conflict
detection/interference process.
In sum, during the second half of presentations, there
were two separable ERP effects across central and pa-
rietal sites. First, there was an early ERP negativity spe-
cifically for items that swapped from requiring repeated
recollection to requiring voluntary avoidance of recol-
lection that therefore appeared to reflect a process that
is engaged when particularly prepotent retrieval has to
be overridden. Second, there was a later emerging (from
450 msec onwards) difference in parietal positivity that
varied with second half think/no-think instructions,
which was highly similar to the ERP effect that varied
with first half think/no-think instructions during the
first half of presentations. There are strong reasons to
assume that this latter effect reflects voluntary control of
recollection, and in the case of items that swapped from
a think to a no-think instruction in the second half,
voluntary avoidance of prepotent recollection.
Possible Caveats, Future Research,
and Implications
The conclusions from the current research are crucially
dependent on one assumption: that the parietal ERP
modulations found around 450–650 msec reflect differ-
ences in the ERP correlate of conscious recollection.
This assumption has high face validity because the pa-
rietal amplitude reduction occurred specifically when
participants were asked to prevent recollection, and the
amplitude change had precisely the polarity, timing,
and topography that would be expected on the basis
of previous research. A very large body of converging
literature suggests that a parietal ERP positivity in this
time window in memory retrieval tasks reflects con-
scious reinstatement of episodic information (see e.g.,
Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg,
1995). The current results converge with findings from
the target/nontarget exclusion task, which suggest that a
reduction of parietal ERP positivity during recognition
reflects the strategic absence of recollection (e.g., Fraser
et al., 2007; Dzulkif li et al., 2006; Dzulkifli & Wilding,
2005; Herron & Wilding, 2005; Wilding et al., 2005;
Herron & Rugg, 2003a, 2003b). The results are also
consistent with fMRI evidence from two studies that
showed reduced recollection-related brain activity dur-
ing no-think trials (Depue et al., 2007; Anderson et al.,
2004). Finally, the conclusion that the parietal EM effect
was voluntarily modulated is consistent with participant
self-reports that they were indeed attempting to avoid
recollection of no-think items, and that they were suc-
cessful at doing so on a large proportion of trials.7
However, the findings from the interference tasks de-
scribed above (e.g., West, 2003) raise the question of
whether some of the ERP effects that are here inter-
preted as voluntary modulations of the parietal EM
effect can be explained by interference/conflict negativ-
ities for items with a no-think instruction, as these items
are associated with a conflict between the prepotent
response (recollection) and the task-appropriate re-
sponse (avoid recollection). Although it is difficult to
conclusively reject this hypothesis, we think it is highly
unlikely for several reasons. First and most importantly;
the follow-up analysis confirmed that the ERP modula-
tions with the typical timing and location of the parietal
EM effect were memory-specific (converging with pre-
vious findings; Bergstro¨m et al., 2007). Think/no-think
instructions interacted with the learning status of the
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associated memory in affecting parietal positivity in a
pattern that was highly consistent with the effect
indexing the amount of conscious recollection. Parietal
positivity was enhanced for items that received a think
instruction only when participants had demonstrably
learned the associated memory, but not when they
had failed to learn the associated memory in the first
place. For learned items that received a no-think instruc-
tion, the parietal ERPs where significantly reduced,
suggesting that participants were successful in avoiding
recollection of learned no-think items. However, parietal
ERPs for items for which the participants had failed to
learn the associate were also significantly more negative
than learned think items, and not significantly different
from ERPs for learned no-think items. This pattern is not
well explained by differences in conflict/interference
associated with the think or no-think instructions, as
such generic task-related processes might be expected
to be engaged irrespectively of the learning status of
the associate. Instead, the results are better explained by
parietal positivity indexing variable amounts of con-
scious recollection between the conditions: Parietal
positivity was only enhanced when participants recol-
lected learned items, but not when recollection failed
because the items had never been successfully learned
in the first place, or when recollection of learned items
was voluntarily prevented.
Furthermore, the main effect of second half think/no-
think instructions during the second half of presenta-
tions was larger and more reliable than the main effect
of first half think/no-think instructions during the first
half, consistent with participants’ ratings that they were
more successful at performing the task during the
second half of presentations. This again suggests that
the main effect of think/no-think instructions on pa-
rietal positivity from 450 msec onward was indexing
the amount of recollected information rather than the
amount of interference or conflict because interference/
conflict accounts would predict the opposite pattern:
ERP negativities should be more prominent when par-
ticipants are having less success and more difficulty, that
is, during the first half of presentations.8 Nevertheless,
an important objective of future research is to fully
disentangle effects relating to interference/conflict from
effects relating to recollection of individual items in ERP
studies of recollection control. Employing a more sen-
sitive measure of success at recollection control could
be the key to achieve this: For example, by collecting
individual estimates of success on a trial-by-trial basis,
recollection control and interference/conflict accounts
could be dissociated on a within-subjects basis, as they
have opposite predictions for how parietal positivity
should vary with success.
As described above, our results converge with earlier
behavioral (Anderson & Green, 2001), fMRI (Depue
et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2004), and ERP evidence
(Bergstro¨m et al., 2007; Fraser et al., 2007; Dzulkif li et al.,
2006; Dzulkif li & Wilding, 2005; Herron & Wilding,
2005; Wilding et al., 2005; Herron & Rugg, 2003a, 2003b;
Dywan et al., 1998, 2001, 2002) in suggesting that con-
scious recollection can be voluntarily controlled. The
voluntary modulations of the parietal EM effect occurred
specifically for items that participants were able to re-
call both when tested in the initial learning test prior
to the think/no-think phase and in the final recall test
following the think/no-think phase. It is therefore highly
likely that participants would have been able to also
recall these items during the think/no-think phase had
they tried to do so, and that ERP differences during the
think/no-think phase thus reflected voluntary processes
at the time recollection or recollection avoidance oc-
curred, rather than differences in forgetting between the
think and no-think conditions (Anderson et al., 2004;
Anderson & Green, 2001). Our results extend on previ-
ous research by suggesting that voluntary control over
recollection is remarkably strong and flexible: Partici-
pants cannot only switch from recollection to avoiding
recollection on an item-by-item basis but they can also
switch from having repeatedly recalled a memory in
response to a cue, to stopping recall of that memory
when the instructions change, and vice versa. This indi-
cates that even in situations when recollection is the
highly practiced, automatic response to a retrieval cue,
voluntary control processes can be recruited to override
unwanted recollection.
Our experiment was only designed to investigate
voluntary control of prepotent recollection, and not to
address the further question of when, and if so how,
avoiding prepotent recollection leads to subsequent
enhanced forgetting (see Depue et al., 2007; Anderson
et al., 2004 for discussions). Because we did not include
a behavioral baseline condition, the current data cannot
address whether or not recollection avoidance was
achieved by an inhibitory mechanism that impaired the
accessibility of avoided memories below baseline, as
proposed in prior research (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004;
Anderson & Green, 2001). However, the data do indi-
cate that prepotent recollection can be successfully
avoided without necessarily producing significant behav-
ioral differences in later forgetting between repeatedly
recalled and avoided memories. These results, together
with our previous findings (Bergstro¨m et al., 2007),
demonstrate how ERPs can be superior to behavioral
measures when investigating voluntary control of recol-
lection. Previous behavioral studies have sometimes
failed to find enhanced forgetting of no-think items in
the final cued recall test (e.g., Bulevich, Roediger, Balota,
& Butler, 2006). Those behavioral studies, however, had
no objective index of whether participants were limit-
ing recollection of no-think items during the think/no-
think phase. Our results, by contrast, provide such an
objective index, namely, the ERPs for no-think items,
and thereby show much more conclusively than those
prior behavioral studies that participants were indeed
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successfully preventing recollection when asked to do
so. Despite the nonsignificant differences in final recall
performance, however, it is of course still possible that
an inhibitory mechanism was involved in terminating
recall of avoided memories in the current study, but
without producing a lasting impairment strong enough
to be measurable on the final test.9
Our research suggests an extension of the classical
distinction between incidental and intentional recollec-
tion (e.g., Curran, 1999; Rugg et al., 1997; Schacter et al.,
1996; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1995; Richardson-
Klavehn, Gardiner, et al., 1994; Moscovitch, 1992) by
illustrating that voluntary control processes can be in-
volved both in facilitating or stopping recollection, de-
pendent on the current task goals. However, the results
do not indicate that voluntary control can always over-
ride automatic recollection, as participants indicated
that the avoided memories still intruded into conscious-
ness on a smaller proportion of trials. There are likely to
be certain types of memories that are too intrusive—at
least initially—to be voluntarily avoided, and there are
also likely to be individual differences in the ability to
voluntarily avoid unwanted memories (Levy & Anderson,
2008). Therefore, future investigations are needed to
establish these possible boundary conditions of volun-
tary control of recollection.
The overall effect of think/no-think instructions on the
parietal EM effect correlated with self-reported ratings
of withholding attention from the memory response so
that the more participants reported actively resisting
acknowledging or attending to the memory, the larger
was the reduction of the parietal EM effect for no-think
cues compared to think cues. This finding is of interest
in the light of recent discussions regarding the nature
of the parietal EM effect (e.g., Rugg & Curran, 2007;
Vilberg, Moosavi, & Rugg, 2006; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn,
& Buckner, 2005; Wilding, 2000). Despite the strong
evidence linking the effect to conscious recollection, its
precise functional significance is uncertain, and accumu-
lating evidence suggests that it may reflect some aspect
of the involvement of attention in episodic retrieval.
One hypothesis is that the effect may reflect attentional
orienting to internal MTL-dependent representations
(see Wagner et al., 2005 for a discussion). However, a
number of studies have shown that the parietal EM
effect is sensitive to the amount of recollected informa-
tion so that it is unlikely to represent a simple all-or-
nothing attentional shift or signal (Vilberg et al., 2006;
Wilding, 2000). Alternatively (e.g., Vilberg et al., 2006;
Wagner et al., 2005), it may index processes that either
support the representation of recollected information,
such as an episodic memory buffer (Baddeley, 2000), or
processes that act on such representations.
Our findings indicate that the size of the parietal EM
effect is related to the amount of attentional resources
allocated to memory representations, hence, is also re-
lated to the amount of episodic information held at the
focus of attention or in the episodic memory buffer
(Baddeley, 2000). It is generally agreed that only in-
formation at the focus of attention is available to con-
sciousness (Velmans, 1996), and a crucial component of
conscious recollection arguably involves allocating at-
tentional resources to memories to-be-recollected (in
fact, some view conscious retrieval as a form of internally
directed attention; e.g., Anderson & Bjork, 1994). Vol-
untary control processes may be able to modulate
whether recollection takes place or not by withholding
attention from memory representations that would
otherwise have become conscious through automatic
MTL/hippocampal cue–trace interactions (Moscovitch,
1992). Such voluntary control may or may not also in-
volve inhibition of the avoided memories (Depue et al.,
2007; Anderson et al., 2004; Levy & Anderson, 2002;
Anderson & Green, 2001). The suggestion that a strate-
gic absence of a parietal EM effect for old items may
reflect the absence of attention to products of cue–trace
interactions has been made previously (Dzulkifli et al.,
2006; Dzulkif li & Wilding, 2005; see also Dywan et al.,
1998, 2001, 2002; for a related account). However, our
results provide the first evidence of a relationship be-
tween a reduction of the parietal EM effect and par-
ticipants self-reported experience of actively resisting
attending to unwanted memories.
The current findings also have implications for prac-
tical applications of memory research in the legal do-
main, where brain activity tests for detecting deception
have received increasing interest as alternatives to stan-
dard ‘‘lie-detector’’ tests measuring autonomic nervous
system activity (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 1991). These
tests rely on measuring the brain activity correlates of
recognition to detect whether suspects are remember-
ing information during the test that only guilty persons
would know. A crucial assumption of these tests is that
memory-related brain activity is uncontrollably elicited
by retrieval cues related to the concealed information.
Previous research has shown that people can avoid de-
tection in these brain activity tests by generating covert
responses to all cue items, including those that are un-
related to the crime in question (Rosenfeld, Soskins,
Bosh, & Ryan, 2004). Our results indicate a countermea-
sure not previously identified in this literature: Suspects
may be able to train themselves to avoid recollection of
incriminating knowledge to elude detection.
In conclusion, in both the first and second half of the
test phase, ERPs showed a significantly reduced late pa-
rietal positivity when participants avoided recollection,
demonstrating that reversing the instructions for some
cues in the second phase had resulted in a within-item
and within-participant reversal of the parietal EM effect.
This effect was during the second phase modulated by
an earlier emerging decrease in centro-parietal positivity
specifically for the items that participants had previously
repeatedly recalled, which therefore seems to index a
process engaged when particularly intrusive memories
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have to be avoided. Our results replicate earlier findings
(Bergstro¨m et al., 2007) which suggested that item-
specific recollection of recollectable information can be
avoided, but extend on those earlier results by showing
that voluntary control over recollection is strong and
flexible. Where previous research had indicated that
people can recruit voluntary strategies to achieve recol-
lection when automatic recollection fails to take place,
we demonstrate that people can also recruit voluntary
strategies to stop recollection of materials that would
otherwise have been automatically recollected.
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Notes
1. If avoided items are more likely to be forgotten on the final
test, this indicates that they were inhibited during the prior
think/no-think phase (e.g., Anderson & Green, 2001). If items
are successfully inhibited, avoiding recollection would require
little voluntary effort, and a reduction of recollection-related
ERP activity during no-think trials could be a consequence
of successful inhibition, reflecting that inhibited items are
no longer automatically recollected. Therefore, the issue of
whether prepotent recollection can be voluntarily prevented
is better examined without subsequent enhanced forgetting
because without enhanced forgetting it is more likely that
recollection remained the prepotent response throughout the
think/no-think phase, and that any reduction of the parietal
EM effect during no-think trials was achieved by effortful, vol-
untary control.
2. This experiment was not specifically designed for contrast-
ing learned and not learned items because this issue was
addressed in our prior study (Bergstro¨m et al., 2007), but the
learning analysis allowed a direct verification of our conclusion
that the parietal modulations were memory-specific. Because
the current analysis split the EEG data into a larger number of
ERP conditions than Bergstro¨m et al. (2007) and also had a
higher initial learning rate, only a subset of 10 participants in
the current study had sufficient trial numbers for adequate
signal-to-noise ratio for the not-learned ERP conditions.
3. The complete results of the strategy questionnaire can be
obtained from the authors on request. See also Levy and
Anderson (2008) for further information on strategy distribu-
tions in the think/no-think task.
4. The bootstrap ratios of this contrast during the second half
(not presented) show a markedly different pattern than the
same contrast during the first half of presentations. During the
second half, the two conditions with first half think instruc-
tions had more positive ERPs than the two conditions with first
half no-think instructions across frontal sites from 800 msec
until the end of the epoch, but there was no reliable effect of
this contrast across parietal sites. Thus, there was no evidence
that both the conditions with first half think instruction simply
retained an increased parietal EM effect during the second half
of presentations (only the T–T condition did, as those items
where still presented with a think instruction; see Figure 6).
5. We did not use a measure of parietal positivity increase
from the earlier (252–448 msec) to the later (452–548 msec)
time window for this follow-up analysis, because as can be seen
in Figure 7B, the specific ERP negativity for T–NT items in this
subgroup was only apparent from around 400 msec post-
stimulus. Analyzing the raw mean amplitudes between 452 and
548 msec was, therefore, deemed sufficient for the purpose of
the follow-up analysis.
6. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
7. In addition, the parietal effect for items that were repeatedly
recollected also responded in a way that is consistent with the
view that this effect, in fact, indexes recollection. A correlate
of recollection should be larger when the same items are re-
peatedly recollected because the magnitude of the parietal EM
effect and the likelihood of recollection increase with repetition
(e.g., Johnson, Kreiter, Russo, & Zhu, 1998). In the current
study, items that were repeatedly presented with think instruc-
tions showed more positive parietal ERPs during the second
than the first half of repetitions (we thank an anonymous re-
viewer for this observation).
8. In addition, the current results provide evidence that a
specific strategy for recollection avoidance was particularly
linked with a reduction of parietal positivity between 450 and
550 msec for no-think cues: the voluntary withholding of at-
tentional resources from the to-be-avoided memory. If the
think/no-think main effect on parietal positivity indexes a gen-
eral conflict/interference response, it is unclear why it would
correlate with such a specific memory control strategy. As we
discuss later in this section, this relationship is of interest in
the light of the recent discussion regarding the functional
significance of the parietal EM effect.
9. The final recall test may have been rather insensitive
because performance was at ceiling. However, there was a
nonsignificant trend for lower final recall of items that were
presented with no-think instructions during the first half of
presentations than final recall of items presented with think
instructions during the first half of presentations, suggesting
that recollection avoidance during the first half may have im-
paired memory to some small degree. We thank an anonymous
reviewer for this observation.
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